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Abstract 
 
Often neglected in the literature about communities 
of practice is the fact that online knowledge-sharing 
communities thrive among illicit collectives whose 
activities are stigmatized or outlawed. This paper 
focuses on a knowledge-sharing community of users 
who engage in illegal practices by examining the ways 
in which the community’s network structure changes 
when a high-stakes, uncertain event—the July 2017 
shutdown of the dark web market Alphabay—occurs. 
This study compares the discussion network structures 
in the subreddit r/AlphaBay during pre-shutdown days 
(the “routine” period) and shutdown days (the 
“market defect” period) and offers a content analysis 
of the knowledge and resources shared by users during 
these periods. Several differences were observed: (a) 
the network structure changed such that the network 
size grew while becoming more centralized; (b) new 
crisis-specific players emerged; (c) types of knowledge 
shared during the market defect period was 
qualitatively different from the routine period. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Knowledge sharing communities are 
commonplace in digital spaces. Decades of literature 
has explored motivations for and effectiveness of 
knowledge collaboration online in various contexts 
such as business [1, 2], distributed software 
development [3—5] and e-learning [6—8]. 
Studies on virtual knowledge sharing have largely 
centered around the notion of “communities of 
practice,” an informal group of people who share 
knowledge, resources, and meaning, and collectively 
learn how to solve problems or do the work better [9]. 
Most studies of knowledge collaboration examine 
online communities of lawful practices. Often 
neglected is the fact that online knowledge sharing 
communities exist, and thrive, for illicit collectives 
whose activities are stigmatized or outlawed [10]. 
Illicit knowledge sharing communities are mostly 
hosted in a hidden side of the digital world: the dark 
web, a collection of websites and web services that are 
accessible only through an anonymizing browser (e.g., 
Tor) or special routing software (e.g., I2P). Not all 
activities in the dark web are harmful. In fact, some 
dark web activity helps expand civil liberties, 
challenging an institutionalized, governmental, or 
otherwise rigid notion of “legitimacy” [11]. The dark 
web often serves as the most secure channel for free 
speech, offering space for journalists, whistleblowers, 
and political dissidents who challenge repressive 
regimes [12, 13]. 
Nonetheless, much dark web activity is dedicated 
to transactions involving illegal products (e.g., drugs 
and weapons), cybercrimes (e.g., malware and cyber-
frauds), and the circulation of harmful content (e.g., 
child pornography). The ecology of communities of 
illicit practices is complicated by the fact that some 
dark web-related content is visible in the surface web 
(e.g., subreddits, news aggregator sites). However, 
information exchanges that occur within communities 
of illicit practices almost always use anonymization 
technologies to conceal identities, regardless of 
whether the community operates only in the darknet or 
is visible in both the dark and surface web. 
This paper focuses on knowledge sharing 
communities of dark web users who engage in illegal 
economic practices. Specifically, we define a cyber-
underground market community as a self-organized 
community of practice and examine the ways in which 
the community’s knowledge sharing network structure 
changes when a high-stakes, uncertain event occurs. 
Illegal markets have been one of the most troubling 
cybersecurity issues concerned with dark web 
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activities, and thus worth the empirical attention. The 
empirical case of interest is the subreddit community 
r/AlphaBay, which was dedicated to discussing a 
cryptomarket called AlphaBay. AlphaBay, which 
became the biggest cyber-underground market, 
operated from December 2014 until July 2017, when it 
was compromised and permanently shut down by law 
enforcement [14]. This study compares the discussion 
network structures in r/AlphaBay during pre-shutdown 
days (the “routine” period) and shutdown days (the 
“market defect” period). This study also offers a 
content analysis of the types of knowledge and 
resources that were shared by users during these 
periods and how members’ communicative activities 
differed during the two periods.  
 
2. Illicit Cybermarket Communities in the 
Dark Web  
 
The existence of cryptomarkets in hidden parts of 
the web has become widely known to the public since 
the seizure of the infamous cyber-underground 
marketplace SilkRoad by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in October 2013. Research has found that 
illicit drugs comprise the most common products 
exchanged in cryptomarkets, followed by stolen data 
[15, 16]. AlphaBay was no exception: A vast portion of 
online discussions about the AlphaBay market alluded 
to illegal drugs.  
Virtual information sharing to assist drug 
transactions is arguably older than the Internet. 
Stanford University and MIT students struck a deal 
regarding a marijuana sale in the early 1970s through 
the ARPANET, the Internet’s predecessor [17]. In the 
1980s and 1990s, a forum known as alt.drugs existed 
in Usenet for drug-related discussions [17]. Early cyber 
drug markets such as AdamFlowers were based on 
encrypted email accounts and relied on monetary 
transactions via Western Union, Paypal, Pecunix, I-
Golder and cash [18].  
Illicit market transactions in the early days were 
sometimes traceable, making it was easier for law 
enforcement to detect the involved actors [18]. The rise 
of anonymizing technologies such as Tor, Virtual 
Private Network (VPN), and cryptocurrency enhanced 
the security of transactions, contributing to the 
expansion of the illicit digital economy. As of April 
2019, 11 retail markets and seven vendor shops were 
listed as English-based marketplaces on 
deepdotweb.com, one of the main news sites for dark 
web market users. Although the status of those 
marketplaces may fluctuate (e.g., being offline, online, 
or temporarily unavailable), they are active markets. 
While drugs are the most common products in these 
markets, other commodities such as weapons, illegal 
services, hacked data, and malware are also sold.  
If marketplaces are one pillar of the cyber-
underground economy, the other pillar is discussion 
forums [19]. Given the instability of market platforms, 
the sustainability of the cyber-underground economy 
depends on timely information sharing among market 
members to help assess vendor and platform credibility 
and security updates. Beyond the whole market being 
compromised, even a single individual’s identity 
breach can increase the collective risk. Therefore, 
community members tend to be proactive with respect 
to sharing knowledge about identity concealment 
strategies, called OPSEC [20—22]. Vendors and users 
often maintain the same screen name across different 
marketplaces and forums as a trust-building 
mechanism [19]. Participation in discussion forums 
helps contributors advertise products, demonstrate 
expertise, and gain visibility as reliable informants. A 
positive reputation established in discussion forums 
can function as social capital [23] that may translate 
into higher economic returns. 
 
3. Illicit Cybermarket Communities as 
Self-Organized Communities of Practice  
 
Considering the role online forums play in the illicit 
cybermarket ecology, an examination of the network 
structures in these forums may help explain how 
cybermarket users engage in knowledge sharing to 
pursue their collective interests. Accordingly, we 
propose to conceptualize illicit cybermarket forums as 
self-organized communities of practice.  
The characteristics of illicit market forums fit 
incredibly well the definition of communities of 
practice. Communities of practice are defined as 
“groups of people informally bound together by shared 
expertise and passion for a joint enterprise” [24, p. 
139]. Communities of practice have become an integral 
part of organizational systems that require some level 
of collective knowledge management, including 
business, government, education, and social sectors 
[25]. Online networks help create decentralized 
communities of practice that are larger scope and size. 
The ways in which hidden cyber-collectives exploit 
digital platforms are commensurate with essential 
features of communities of practices [24, 25].  
 
3.1. Purposiveness 
 
A community of practice “is defined by a shared 
domain of interest” [25, p.1]. The illicit market actors 
share a clearly defined agenda: to engage in economic 
activities that are stigmatized or outlawed by legitimate 
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institutions. Due to the nature of illegitimacy, members 
also share another problem: OPSEC. Specifically, the 
interests in OPSEC have evolved at two levels. At the 
“system level,” market platforms are vulnerable to the 
risks of hacking, theft, and infiltration by law 
enforcement; at the “process level,” vendors can 
deceive buyers (e.g., not shipping a promised product) 
[15]. 
 
3.2. Practice 
 
A community of practice is where members learn 
about “becoming a practitioner, not learning about 
practice” [26, p.48, italics original]. Therefore, the 
process of knowledge sharing in communities of 
practice is oriented toward pragmatic, experiential 
learning. The illicit market forum members have a 
shared goal of becoming a “successful” practitioner: 
buying or selling drugs without being busted. The 
primary aim of the forums, therefore, is to document 
and exchange technical and practical knowledge 
needed to securely participate in high-stakes activities. 
Other motives such as punditry, leisure, or 
socialization may be observed but they are auxiliary 
drivers of social interactions in these forums.  
 
3.3. Knowledge Embedded in Social 
Interactions 
 
Learning is the main function of communities of 
practices [9]. Unlike formal training or structured 
teaching, knowledge is gained through informal social 
interactions in which not only “objective” knowledge 
but also, and more importantly, “insider” know-how is 
embedded [26, p.48]. Learning in communities of 
practice thus translates to internalizing the culture of 
collectives such as viewpoints, vernaculars, and 
behavioral rules [26].  
The dark web market forums are where market 
users with different levels of experience get together to 
share with and learn from peers’ knowledge and 
experiences. While some forums include well-
formatted technical tutorials on how to use markets, the 
largest portion of communicative activities observed in 
these forums is in the form of real-time questions and 
answers [20]. Novices seek tips and advice; 
experienced users share previous experiences, which in 
turn constitute a collective narrative of the dark web 
market history; the involved members share up-to-date 
information about markets’ status and share vendor 
reviews. Such learning occurs in the midst of informal 
discursive interactions.  
 
3.4. Self-selection 
A community of practice is not a formal 
organization. Unlike project group assignments or 
organizational divisions, members voluntarily choose 
to be a part of the community [24]. Individual 
members’ positions in the community are thus 
determined not hierarchically but based on the level of 
time and effort they spend in the community at their 
own will.  
Such informality and meritocracy are defining 
characteristics of dark web market forums [20]. 
Whereas actual marketplaces are run by more or less 
canonical rules (e.g., imposing mechanisms of social 
control and administrative authority to ban certain 
vendors and buyers), most discussion forums are run as 
an open, self-regulated network of voluntary members. 
The level of expertise, experience, or technical 
sophistication are not criteria for membership, although 
there is an implicit expectation that a user should 
achieve some level of expertise through both informal 
learning in forums as well as actual engagement in 
market activities to become a true member of the 
community.  
 
3.5. Self-organized Knowledge Collaboration  
 
Based on informal social interactions and self-
selective membership, communities of practice can be 
understood as a self-organized knowledge sharing 
system. An essential characteristic of a virtual self-
organizing system is its fluidity [27]. A fluid 
organizing system lacks traditional structural 
mechanisms such that organizational positions, roles, 
and boundaries are loosely defined [27]. Instead, 
fluidity allows “highly flexible and permeable 
boundaries” of communities, making it difficult “to 
figure out who is in the community and who is outside 
at any point in time, let alone over time” [p.1226]. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of knowledge collaboration 
do not rely on predefined role structures or adhesive 
“people-to-people relations” [p.1235]. Rather, the 
collaborative network changes its configuration 
constantly based on the flow of ideas, external 
conditions, and the nature of problems that the 
community collectively encounters. Scholarship has 
referred to such organizational flexibility for 
knowledge collaboration as “emergent network” [28—
30] or “generative response” [27].  
The dark web market forms are a space for fluid 
collectives in that there is no strict protocol to enter 
and exit, insofar as a user has a basic ability to get 
access to it anonymously. Although administrators may 
moderate community interactions to some extent, the 
community does not impose a formal hierarchy. 
Anonymous social interactions make the community 
even more permeable because members’ real identities 
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are concealed from one another and thus social 
interactions are assumed to be inherently temporary 
and transitory [31].  
In sum, as a self-organized system, knowledge 
sharing dynamics in illicit market forums can be highly 
adaptive to the nature of problems, level of uncertainty, 
and who has what types of knowledge at a given 
moment. Given that few studies have examined the 
emergence of knowledge sharing networks in the dark 
web market forums, the current study attempts to 
contribute to understanding the self-organizing aspect 
of these communities.  
 
4. Empirical Context and Research 
Questions 
 
This study presents a case of the cryptomarket 
called AlphaBay. AlphaBay was shut down in July 
2017. Initially suspected as an exit scam (i.e., a fraud 
by the market administrators), it later turned out that 
the shutdown was caused by an international law 
enforcement team comprised of the U.S., Canada, and 
Thailand. On July 15, 2015, Alexandre Cazes, a co-
founder of the market who was arrested on the same 
day as the shutdown, was found dead in jail in 
Thailand. AlphaBay was the largest cyber-underground 
market to emerge since the shutdown of the legendary 
market SilkRoad, with $600,000 to $800,000 in daily 
revenue.  
Several major forums served as communities of 
practices for AlphaBay users, including AlphaBayfrm 
(an AlphaBay market-specific forum hosted in Tor), 
The Hub (a multi-market forum hosted in Tor), and 
several subreddits on Reddit.com. This paper focuses 
on one of the subreddit communities, r/AlphaBay.  
This paper is particularly interested in the 
emergent network structure of the illicit market forum. 
As a self-organized knowledge sharing collective, the 
community dynamics may reveal fluid knowledge 
flows depending on the types of problems that users 
collectively face. Specifically, in ordinary times, the 
problems users encounter may be more routinized, 
centered around vendor credibility and procedural 
issues related to access, transactions, and shipping. 
However, when a system-level defect in the market 
platform is abruptly experienced, the non-routine 
situation may pose more severe collective risks with a 
higher level of uncertainty. Facing a non-routine, 
highly uncertain event could change the interaction 
dynamics.  
 We contend that such change should be manifest 
in two forms: (a) We anticipate changes in 
communication network structures. According to 
communication network evolution perspective, a crisis 
event plays a role in changing the structure of 
computer-mediated communication networks. For 
example, a study of an inter-organizational email 
network showed that both communication volumes and 
number of communicators have increased when 
members faced an organizational uncertainty. Also, the 
network tends to form a giant component rather than 
being fragmented into subgroups [32]. More recently, 
Twitter research in the context of natural disaster 
(Japanese earthquake and Tsunami) found that affected 
users (i.e., Japanese users) intensified their degree of 
interactions than non-affected users (i.e., non-
Japanese). Such interactions, however, have increased 
among the existing users, with less activity of newly 
joining or quitting a community [33]. (b) Along with 
network change, the nature of communicative content 
shared among members may also change. For example, 
prior research has shown that, along with the average 
length of individual messages being shortened, 
conversations became less diverse and more 
concentrated toward problem-solving [32, 33]. Also, 
decentralized problem-solving efforts and concerns 
about safety and wellness of community members 
became prominent in the electronic messages 
exchanged during the crisis period [34].  While 
existing studies were based on legitimate communities 
or organizational networks, little is known whether 
illicit, hidden cyber communities will exhibit similar 
patterns in network changes and communication 
contents when they face a highly uncertain situation.  
As a preliminary study, this paper posits two research 
questions.  
RQ1: How does the structure of the knowledge 
sharing network change in an illicit market forum 
when the community collectively experiences a critical 
market defect? 
RQ2: How do communicative activities change in 
an illicit market forum when the community 
collectively experiences a critical market defect? 
 
5. Methods 
 
5.1. Data Collection 
 
The subreddit data (r/AlphaBay) was provided by 
a cybersecurity firm that has partnered with the 
university where the authors are affiliated (Company 
name will be identified upon the paper acceptance). 
Whereas mainstream media reported that AlphaBay 
was seized on a specific day (July 4, 2017), the market 
users’ experience was not a one-day event. Instead, 
users experienced errors and irregularities for multiple 
days around the time of the seizure. To identify the 
timespan of the market defect more precisely, we 
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adopted a previous study’s method that was used to 
detect the anomaly period in social media activities 
[35]. 
Specifically, we first examined the longitudinal 
pattern of daily posting volumes over a year, from June 
2016 to July 2017. The daily average of total posting 
was 48.48 posts a day (SD=62.34) and the daily 
average number of newly created topic threads was 
6.03 (SD=5.73). Second, we used the number of newly 
created topic threads as a criterion to identify the 
anomaly in activity volumes. We used the topic threads 
instead of total post activities because it is possible that 
a certain old topic could continue to draw 
conversations over time regardless of the shutdown 
event. Beginning a new discussion thread, however, 
may be more reflective of what is happening at a given 
moment. Next, we defined days were considered part 
of the anomaly period if a daily number of newly 
created topic threads exceeded two standard deviations 
from the mean (=17.50). Lastly, we reviewed the actual 
posts made during the identified anomaly days to 
understand what had happened and whether the 
happening was indeed related to a non-routine problem 
with a high level of uncertainty.  
From the procedure above, we identified two 
abnormal periods, one in December 2016 and another 
in July 2017. The review of the posts suggested that the 
market was offline temporarily on December 13 and 
14, 2016; and the market defect, which eventually was 
linked to the permanent shutdown, was experienced for 
about 10 days from July 5 to July 14, 2017 (Figure 1). 
This study focuses on the identified ten days of the 
market defect in July 2017. The total number of topic 
threads that were created during the market defect 
period was 346, and the total number of posts was 
1,587. For comparison, we also examined a similar 
number of topic threads and posts made prior to the 
beginning of the market defect period, which spanned 
from May 19, 2017, to July 4, 2017. We defined this 
time window as a “routine period,” which included the 
creation of 383 topic threads and 1,663 posts. As a 
result, a total of 3,250 posts were analyzed.  
 
5.2. Network Analysis 
 
Network analysis requires two sets of variables: 
nodes and edges. In this study, nodes are anonymous 
users involved in discursive activities in the examined 
subreddit forum. Edges are defined as non-directional 
ties that represent co-posting behaviors. The default 
format of the network data was a two-mode (user-by-
thread) matrix that informs which users contributed to 
which topic threads. The default format was 
transformed into a one-mode (user-by-user) 
sociometric matrix based on co-postings in the same 
topic threads (Figure 2a and 2b).  
 
  
Figure 1. Daily creation of topic threads 
between June 2016 and July 2017. Red 
markers are the days with a sudden increase 
in volume (> 17.5). 
 
 
Figure 2a. An example of transforming a two-
mode (user-by-thread, directional) matrix to 
the corresponding one-mode (user-by-user, 
nondirectional) network. Diagonal values (blue 
cells) in the one-mode matrix indicate each 
user’s total posting frequency.  
 
 
Figure 2b. Sociograms of two-mode network 
vs. one-mode network based on the 
sociometric data exemplified in Figure 2a.  
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The co-posting matrix is more useful in this study 
than the original user-by-thread matrix because it 
allows for examining who were exposed to whose 
ideas/knowledge as well as who were the most active 
contributors across different topics.  
That said, the transformation of a two-mode 
network into a one-mode network loses one important 
property of the data: the absolute total number of posts 
that a user contributed. For example, suppose users i 
and j contributed one post to the same thread A. The 
co-posting-based edge weight between user i and j 
would be 1 (Eij=1). If user i made three posts across 
three different topic threads A, B, and C, and user j 
also made three posts across the three same threads A, 
B, and C, the edge weight between i and j would be 3 
(Eij=3). However, if user i made three posts across 
threads A, B, and C, while user j also made three posts 
yet only in thread A, the co-posting-based edge weight 
between i and j will be just 1 (Eij=1) even if user j’s 
total number of posts was 3. Furthermore, suppose user 
i made three posts across threads A, B, and C, whereas 
user j made three posts across D, E, and F. In this case, 
their co-posting-based edge weight will score zero 
(Eij=0) irrespective of how many contributions each 
user has made.  
 Considering that the one-mode transformation 
engendered the loss of the total posting information, 
we created a node attribute that indicates the total 
number of posts a user contributed across all topic 
threads during each period (i.e., routine and market 
defect period). As presented in a later section, we used 
both co-posting-based degree centrality and the total 
post frequency as key performance indicators (KPI).  
 
5.3. Content Analysis 
 
Considering that an essential goal of communities 
of practice is knowledge sharing for problem-solving, 
we analyzed whether a post contains strategic 
assessment that helps improve the situation or solve 
problems. Organizational uncertainty management 
literature suggests that group members reduce 
uncertainty in two ways. First, they collectively make 
sense of the status of the situation (e.g., how likely the 
concerned outcome is to occur or how severe the 
outcome would be) [33]. The group information 
processing perspective [34] defines such type of 
uncertainty management as “closure,” which refers to 
reaching a conclusion of how to define the state of the 
situation. Second, community members manage the 
uncertainty by sharing specific resources and 
knowledge that help identify what actions should be 
taken to appropriately respond to the situation or 
problems [33].  
Based on the literature, a post was defined as 
containing a strategic assessment if the message had a 
conclusive statement that definitively diagnosed the 
situation or if the user suggested actionable item(s) to 
resolve or improve the situation or problems. About 
10% of the posts were analyzed for intercoder 
reliability, reaching 90.23% agreement and a Cohen’s 
Kappa coefficient of .685, suggesting substantial 
agreement. 
 
6. Results  
 
6.1. Network Structure Overview 
 
The number of posts included for the market defect 
period (=1,587) was less than the routine period 
(=1,663). Nonetheless, the co-posting network analysis 
revealed that more users and more co-posting edges 
were included in the market defect period than the 
routine period. Specifically, 709 users created 24,320 
co-posting ties during the market defect period, 
whereas 592 users created 6,296 ties during the routine 
period. The large number of co-posting ties also 
resulted in higher average degree centrality (weighted) 
during the market defect period (=36.181) than the 
routine period (=11.196) 
Conventionally, a network tends to have a lower 
density as its size grows because density is computed 
against the total number of all possible edges. This was 
not the case in this study, however. Even if there were 
more users involved in discussions during the market 
defect period, the co-posting activities were so 
extensive that the network density (=.048) was also 
noticeably higher than the routine period (=.018).  
Along with density, other structural characteristics 
similarly suggested that the market defect period 
showed more concentrated and centralized knowledge 
sharing patterns than the routine period, including a 
shorter network diameter and shorter average path 
length, and a larger clustering coefficient and larger 
centralization coefficient. Table 1 compares the 
network structural characteristics between the routine 
and market defect period. Also, Figure 3a and 3b 
visualize the co-posting network structure configured 
in each period.  
 
Table 1. Co-posting network analysis results. 
Network properties Routine  Market 
Defect  
# of posts included 1663 1587 
# of nodes 592 709 
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# of edges 6296 24320 
Avg. degree (weighted) 11.196 36.181 
Network diameter 9 7 
Graph density .018 .048 
Avg. clustering coefficient .797 .826 
Avg. path length 3.492 2.771 
Centralization (degree) .236 .474 
 
6.1. Key Players Identification 
 
Degree centrality and total posting frequency were 
used as KPIs to identify “key players” in each time 
period. Specifically, we first selected the top 10% of 
users based on the degree centrality during the routine 
and market defect period, respectively. Then we 
selected another top 10% of users based on the posting 
frequency during each time period. Some users had 
both high degree centrality and posting frequency and 
thus were selected repeatedly. As a result of using both 
KPIs, we identified a total of 174 key players. Eighteen 
(10%) of these key players appeared in both routine 
and market defect periods, 64 (37%) were associated 
only with the routine period, and 92 (53%) uniquely 
emerged during the market defect period. In other 
words, those who emerged as active participants during 
the market defect period were different users from 
those active during the routine period.  
 
 
Figure 3a. Co-posting network during the 
routine period. Nodes are colored based on 
degree centrality, with red (>= 150), blue (100-
149), green (50-99), and yellow (< 50). 
 
 
Figure 3a. Co-posting network during the 
market defect period. Some peripheral nodes 
were removed from the visualization. Nodes 
are colored based on degree centrality, with 
red ( >=150), blue (100-149), green (50-99), and 
yellow (< 50). 
 
6.2. Knowledge Sharing for Strategic 
Assessment  
 
The content analysis resulted in 356 posts that 
contained strategic assessment during the routine 
period (21.4% out of 1663 posts) and 369 posts during 
the market defect period (23.25% out of 1587 posts). 
Although key players constituted only a small fraction 
of users engaged in each period, they were incredibly 
active in sharing strategic knowledge in both periods, 
accounting for 55% (post N=198) of the total strategic 
knowledge sharing during the routine period and 57% 
(post N=210) during the market defect. The rest of 
strategic knowledge sharing was contributed by non-
key players (Table 2 and Figure 4).  
 
Table 2. Strategic assessment posts made by 
key players (KP) and non-key players. 
 Routine  Market Defect  
 User N Post N User N Post N 
All-time KP 18 44 
(12%) 
18 49 
(13%) 
Period- 
specific KP 
64 154 
(43%) 
92 161 
(44%) 
Non KP 510 158 
(45%) 
599 159 
(43%) 
Total 592 346 
(100%) 
709 369 
(100%) 
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The distribution of strategic knowledge sharing 
across the three user types—all-time key players, 
period-specific key players, and non-key players —
were similar between the two time periods. In other 
words, the proportion of contributions from each group 
was consistent between the routine and market defect 
period.  
However, when the actual messages were reviewed, 
the nature of shared knowledge was distinctive 
between the two time periods. Specifically, during the 
routine period, the strategic knowledge sharing was 
centered around (a) how to use AlphaBay securely, 
e.g., “if you are using ab without a vpn then your isp 
already knows what you’re doing. If you have a vpn 
then net neutrality elimination shouldn’t be a 
significant problem”1; (b) information related to 
shipping and transactions, e.g., “paper is a hard thing 
to find among thousands of other packs of paper.” 2; 
and (c) vendor information, e.g., “if you don’t mind 
international then gammagoblin with over 250$ spent 
gets tracked so you have that safety.” 
Meanwhile, during the market defect period, the 
attempt for closure was made by concluding 
Alphabay’s shutdown was an exit scam, e.g., “... it's 
looking more and more like they've fucked us. for me i 
lost quite a bit mid purchase. but nowhere near as 
much as some people.. if they stay down it'll ruin lives. 
be nice. help find vendors. do what you can because 
some people might have really fucked up.” It was only 
after July 12 when the correct conclusion was reached 
that the shutdown was caused by law enforcement, 
e.g., “Alphabay taken down by law enforcement across 
3 countries...lol...yes. It was official yesterday really. 
There is no hope for alpha whatsoever.” Another 
chunk of strategic assessment in this period related to 
alternative markets or routes for transactions, e.g., 
“Hansa [market] is so much safer. You are probably a 
vendor which is why you are supporting Dream 
market.”  
In both routine and market defect periods, security-
related discussions such as the importance of VPN, 
encryption, and running the privacy program Tails with 
a virtual machine, recurred consistently, e.g. “the 
biggest silver lining with alphabay going away is now 
you get a nice reset on your opsec…i’ll send it 
unencrypted and just trust this handy little checkbox to 
do the hard work for me? at least those unencrypted 
messages are likely no longer a risk as le will 
probably...move on as well like us to the next active 
market.”3  
                                                 
1
 ab = AlphaBay; isp = Internet Service Provider. 
2
 paper = an ingestible form of drug tablet 
3
 le = law enforcement 
 
Figure 4. Percentage contribution of strategic 
knowledge sharing by types of users during 
routine vs. market defect period. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The current study investigated a subreddit forum 
for cryptomarket market activities on the dark web. We 
defined an online community of illicit market users as 
a form of community of practice. Although illicit 
market communities in the dark web are unique in that 
the nature of practice is concealed and illegitimate, 
they are ultimately human organizing system. By 
examining illicit market communities as self-organized 
knowledge-sharing collectives, this paper attempted to 
expand the understanding of the communicatively 
organizing principles for uncertainty management in 
illicit cyber-market system. Our results suggest that, 
despite the illicit nature, the collaborative dynamics 
and organizing principles were strikingly resonant with 
essential characteristics of “normal” communities of 
practice. 
Particularly, this study focused on the comparison 
between routine and market defect periods. Literature 
on emergent collaboration networks has suggested that 
efficient network structures may vary depending on 
whether a task is routine and non-routine [28]. Drawn 
from early insights, this study compared the network 
structures as well as the content of strategic knowledge 
shared in each period. 
Findings suggested that, while the distribution of 
sheer volume of strategic posts was not much different 
between the two periods, several differences were 
observed: (a) the network structure changed such that 
the network size grew while co-posting patterns were 
more centralized; (b) new crisis-specific key players 
emerged; (c) types of knowledge shared during the 
market defect period was qualitatively different from 
the routine period. While the majority of strategic 
knowledge was contributed by a small fraction of key 
players, the contribution by non-key players, who may 
also be defined as “peripheral legitimate participants” 
[27, p.1226], was not trivial. Future research is 
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recommended to examine how different or similar the 
nature of shared knowledge is between different user 
types (all-time key players, period-specific key players, 
and peripheral legitimate participants). The current 
study is one of early work on communication network 
evolution in hidden cyber collectives. While the 
findings and discussions in this paper are preliminary, 
future research may delve further into communication 
organizational principles in “normal” online 
communities and virtual organizations, and 
systematically compare how similar or different the 
illicit cyber-communities on the dark web are from the 
communities in visible digital space.  
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